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Virginia's New Last Clear Chance Doctrine
Wnaa~x T. MusE
Rule # 1. Where the injured person has negligently placed
himself in a situation of peril from which he is physically
unable to remove himself, the defendant is liable if he saw,
or should have seen, him [and realized, or ought to have
realized, his peril] in time to avert the accident by using
reasonable care.
'Rule # 2. Where the plainfiff has negligently placed him-
self in a situation of peril from which he is physically able to
remove himself, but is unconscious of his peril, the defendant
is liable only if he saw the plaintiff and realized, or ought to
have realized, his peril in time to avert the accident by using
reasonable care.
These two rules state the new last clear chance doctrine in
Virginia. They were announced by the Supreme Court of
Appeals in a unanimous decision on September 14, 1955, in
Greear v. Noland Co., 197 Va. 233, 238. Rule # 1 has always
been the law in Virginia and elsewhere. Rule # 2 is new, and
it brings Virginia -in line with the overwhelming weight of
authority in America. Prior to this decision the Virginia law
on last clear chance was in a state of hopeless confusion. The
court, itself, on several occasions admitted this to be so, For
example, in Harris Motor Lines, Inc. v. Green, 184 Va. 984,
992 (1946) the court said:
We will not undertake to discuss, or attempt to recon-
cile, the cases in which the doctrine has been applied
or withheld. This would be impossible because the cases
are irreconcible.
How did the law become so confused in Virginia? This can
be best answered by a brief survey of the cases. Pointing out
the mistakes of the past should also serve as a warning against
the continued use of the erroneous statements found in the
older cases which now have been overruled. The study of the
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last clear chance doctrine as developed in the Virginia cases
will be made easier, it would seem, by first restating some
fundamental principles.
Civil liability is based on fault. It is the general common
law concept that a defendant is liable only if he is guilty of
legal fault. The usual legal fault in tort law is either inten-
tional conduct or negligent conduct. In the cases dealt with in
this paper the fault of the defendant consists of his negligence.
A defendant's negligence, however, is not enough to subject
him to liability; his negligence must be a proximate cause of
the injury or harm to the plaintiff. The concept of negligence
is a separate and distinct concept from that of proximate
cause. They are mutually exclusive. Proximate cause must
exist whether the defendant's conduct is negligent or inten-
tionaL Even in the exceptional cases where there is absolute
or strict liability (i.e. liability without fault) the require-
ment of proximate cause exists. Indeed, proximate cause is
a general concept running throughout many fields of law,
including criminal law and contracts. In contracts of fire
insurance the fire must proximately cause the loss, or in the
case of an accident policy the accident must be a proximate
cause of the injury. Negligence and proximate cause have
been confused in Virginia. At times the phrase "proximate
cause" has been used to mean (1) negligence, or (2) proximate
cause, or (3) more frequently, to mean negligence and causa-
tion wrapped up in one concept.
If the defendant is negligent and his negligence is a proxi-
mate cause of injury to the plaintiff, and nothing more is
shown, the defendant is liable. However, if the plaintiff is
also negligent and his negligence is also a proximate cause of
the iniury, recovery is barred. This is known as the doctrine of
contributory negligence. The Virginia court frequently, but
erroneously, employs the language of proximate cause to
explain the doctrine of contributory negligence. The fallacy of
doing this is obvious since the defendant's negligence subjects
him to liability only if his negligence is a proximate cause of
the injury and, likewise, the plaintiff's negligence bars his
recovery only if his negligence proximately contributes to
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the injury. The doctrine of contributory negligence presup-
poses that the conduct of each party is a proximate cause.
The doctrine of contributory negligence cannot be explained
in terms of proximate and remote cause.
The exception to the doctrine of contributory negligence,
which allows the plaintiff to recover from a negligent defend-
ant even though he, himself, has been contributorily negligent,
is known as the last clear chance doctrine. The doctrine had
its inception in the landmark case of Davies v. Mann, 10 M.
& W. 546 (1842). What is the correct statement of the doc-
trine? When should it be applied? When should it not be
applied? These are not merely academic questions. Sub-
stantial verdicts daily turn upon proper or improper instruc-
tions on last clear chance.
For all practical purposes there are two last clear chance
doctrines, each applicable to separate and distinct factual
situations. Rule # 1 above applies where the plaintiff is
physically unable to save himself, i.e. it applies in the case of
a helpless plaintiff. Rule # 2 above applies where the plaintiff
is physically able to save himself but is unconscious of his
peril due to inattention, i.e. it applies in the case of an inat-
tentive plaintiff. The Virginia court, prior to the Greear case,
applied Rule # 1 to both the helpless plaintiff and the in-
attentive plaintiff. There seem to be two reasons for this mis-
take. First, the court failed to understand that there were two
different doctrines, each applicable to factual situations which
are quite different yet bearing the same name. Second, the
court failed to distinguish between "seeing" the plaintiff and
"realizing" his peril. It will be observed that "seeing" in
Rule # 1 is objective, i.e. the defendant "saw or should have
seen" the plaintiff, whereas in Rule #2 "seeing" is subjec-
tive, i.e. the defendant "saw" (not "or should have seen") the
plaintiff. On the other hand, "realizing" is objective in both
rules, i.e. the defendant "realized or ought to have realized"
that the plaintiff was in peril. Seeing the plaintiff and realiz-
ing that he is in peril are two different things. This confusion
is evident from the court's blending the two in the repeated
statement that the last clear chance doctrine applies if the de-
fendant "saw or should have seen the plaintiff's perilous
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situation." What does perilous situation mean? Does it refer
to the plaintiff's peril? If so, the statement is correct. Does
it refer to the plaintiff's situation which is perilous whether
the defendant realizes or not that it is perilous? If, so, the
statement is incorrect.
The Virginia court has described its application of the law
of Rule # 1 to the factual situation of Rule # 2 as the
"humanitarian doctrine" of last clear chance. It is rather
humanitarian to the plaintiff though not to the defendant
for it requires the defendant to exercise greater care for the
safety of the plaintiff than the plaintiff is required to exercise
for his own safety. The result is to allow the plaintiff to
recover when he and the defendant are both negligently inat-
tentive and therefore guilty of exactly the same amount and
kind of negligence. Of course, the so-called humanitarian
doctrine completely abrogates the doctrine of contributory
negligence.
The court has always correctly applied Rule # 1 to the
"helpless plaintiff." In tracing the cases, only the cases in-
volving the "inattentive plaintiff" will be referred to since
it is in these that Rule # 1 has been applied to the factual
situation existing in Rule # 2.
The first four cases to -arise in Virginia, beginning with Dun
v. Seaboard and Roanoke R. R. Co., 78 Va. 645 (1884 ), prop-
erly applied Rule # 2. The next two cases applied Rule # 1
to an inattentive plaintiff, i.e. they applied the so-called
humanitarian doctrine. In the first of these an instruction
embodying the humanitarian doctrine was approved without
comment. In the second case the court, aware that the gen-
erally accepted rule was contra, said that the humanitarian
doctrine "is undoubtedly the established doctrine of this
court." (Emphasis added.) See Va. Mid. B . R. Co. v. White,
84 Va. 498, 504 (1888). In support of this surprising result
three Virginia cases were cited. In the first of the three the
point was not considered. In the second the decision was
exactly contra. The third case was not in point since it in-
volved a helpless plaintiff. The trouble began with the holding
in Va. Mid R. R. Co. v. White, supra. This was the court's
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"original sin." In Richmond & Danville By. Co. v. Yeamans,
86 Va. 860 (1890), arising two years later, the court expressly
refused to follow the humanitarian doctrine and reversed the
lower court for having given an instruction embodying it. The
next four cases also were decided properly but, unfortunately,
employed some loose language that proved to be a pitfall in
subsequent cases. This caused the court in the next sixteen
cases to misinterpret the loose phrase "perilous situation"
used in the last few cases and apply the humanitarian doc-
trine. In the opinions both the humanitarian doctrine and the
proper doctrine are stated side by side, apparently without
realizing the inconsistency.
In an opinion by Keith, P., the court in Southern By. Co. v.
Bailey, 110 Va. 833 (1910) expressly rejected the humani-
tarian doctrine and adopted Rule # 2. This would seem to
have ended the vacillation of the court; however, just eight
months later in another opinion by President Keith the hu-
manitarian doctrine was again embraced. See Chesapeake and
Ohio By. Co. v. Shipp's Adm'rx., 111 Va. 377 (1910). The
judge cited in support of this conclusion his former decision
which held contra. The succeeding five cases followed the
humanitarian doctrine.
The next opportunity the court had to consider the doctrine
was four years later in Chesapeake and Ohio By. Co. v.
Saunder's Adm'r., 116 Va. 826, 831 (1914). The court reverted
to Rule # 2, saying: "In the light of the settled doctrine upon
the subject in this jurisdiction, it is sufficient to say that the
proposition announced by this instruction [i.e. the humani-
tarian doctrine] cannot be sustained." The next case also ac-
curately stated Rule #2 as the proper one and distinguished
between seeing the plaintiff and realizing his peril. See Nor-
folk Southern R. R. Co. v. Croker 117 -Va. 327, 333 (1915).
In spite of the accuracy and clarity of the opinion in the
Croker ease, the next eleven cases quote the ambigious lan-
guage of the earlier cases. The next three cases, "h6wever,
again revert to the proper rule. Then the court, in the next
case, again returns to the humanitarian doctrine. The next
seventeen cases state both of these inconsistent views and it
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is impossible to determine from the statement of the facts
whether the plaintiff was helpless or inattentive.
This survey brings us to 1930 and the well-considered case
of Barnes v. Ashworth, 154 Va. 218 (1930). This case settled
all doubt about the Virginia law and adopted the humani-
tarian doctrine. In the opinion Mr. Justice Epes gave a full
analysis of both last clear chance doctrines, pointed out the
factual situation to which each applies, and emphasized the
distinction in the rules about "seeing" and "realizing".
While he did not favor the humanitarian doctrine he thought
the court had gone too far with it to turn back. Certainly,
anyone reading this case would have thought that the hu-
manitarian doctrine was thereby established as the settled
law of Virginia for the future.
It would seem that the court was now committed, but not
so! Subsequent cases began immediately to copy the ambigi-
ous language of the older cases and seldom relied on Barnes
v. Ashworth. Why7 The court was not satisfied with the
results in some cases. The humanitarian doctrine allowed the
plaintiff to recover when he and the defendant were equally
guilty of inattention. Where the court thought the result was
fair it would allow the humanitarian doctrine to have its full
effect. In other cases, where the court could not tolerate the
result, while giving lip service to the humanitarian doctrine
the court employed one of three devices to avoid what it con-
sidered to be a bad result. None of the three devices are
scientific, nor has the court consistently used them. The de-
vices are:
1. "If the plaintiff's negligence continues down to and
efficiently contributes to the injury the last clear chance doc-
trine does not apply." The fallacy of this device is obvious.
In all cases the effect of the plaintiff's negligence must con-
tinue down to the injury and efficiently contribute thereto in
order to bar the plaintiff's recovery. If it does not do this the
plaintiff's negligence is not a proximate cause. If not a proxi-
mate cause the plaintiff may recover in spite of his negligence.
Therefore, the problem here is one of contributory negligence
and not one of last clear chance. The court has employed this
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device in some cases and ridiculed it in others, e.g. the Croker
case, supra. When the court will apply it and when it will not
do so cannot be determined from the decided cases.
2. "The last clear chance doctrine applies to the plaintiff
as well as the defendant." This statement is obviously absurd.
There can only be one "the last clear chance." If each party
has a clear chance to avoid the injury, of course both of them
could not be last clear chances. An -actual case will demon-
strate the absurdity of this device. In Stephen Putney Shoe
Co., v. Ormsby's Adm'r., 129 Va. 297, 304 (1921) the defendant
in making a left turn at an intersection while driving his
truck was negligently inattentive to crossing pedestrian traffic.
The plaintiff, a pedestrian, was inattentively crossing at the
intersection when he was hit and injured by the truck. The
defendant was negligent in not keeping a proper look out and
this negligence was a proximate cause of the collision. The
plaintiff was also negligent in not being attentive to vehicular
traffic and this negligence was also a proximate cause of the
collision. This was a simple case for the application of the
doctrine of contributory negligence under which plaintiff's
recovery would be barred. The case should have ended there.
The court, however, further stated that if the defendant had
a last clear chance the plaintiff had one also.
3. "If the defendant has the last clear chance to avoid
the injury then his negligence becomes the proximate cause
and the plaintiff's negligence the renzote cause". The use of
the technique of proximate cause to explain the doctrine of
last clear chance has added to the confusion. Proximate cause
and last clear chance are separate and distinct concepts. The
point in a case where last clear chance becomes applicable is
reached only after it has first been determined that the acts
of both of the parties, plaintiff and defendent, are proximate
causes of the injury. This myth was sufficiently exploded in
IV. B..Bassett and Co. v. Wood, Ad 'r. 146 Va. 654, 669 (1926)
where the court said:
The confusion that arises in the application of the
principle of law that while one is negligent, another
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negligently employs an independent force, which availing
itself of the occasion afforded by the former's negligence,
works a harm not its natural and probable consequence,
but an independent harm, the first negligence is not con-
tributory to the second, is due to too rigid construction
of the words last clear chance, where the negligence of the
plaintiff is antecedent or the remote cause of the harm
and the defendant's negligence the subsequent and inde-
pendent cause of the injury. The doctrine of last clear
chance, strictly speaking, applies only to those cases
where the negligence of the parties contribute or con-
cur to cause the injury, . ..
In this state of confusion it had become almost impossible
for counsel or trial judges to predict with any degree of
assurance what the court would hold in any given case. The
court had given effect to the humanitarian doctrine in many
cases and in many other cases on similar facts neutralized its
effect by use of one or more of the devices enumerated above.
Under these circumstances counsel feared to submit almost
any case to the jury without a last clear chance instruction,
with the consequence that the doctrine was needlessly invoked
in almost all negligence cases. It became urgent that the
court adopt a definite rule that could be uniformly applied.
It had been unwilling to uniformly apply the humanitarian
doctrine.
An excellent opportunity to announce Rule # 2 as the new
doctrine in Virginia was presented in Anderson v. Payne, 189
Va. 712 (1949), but the court failed to do so by one vote. The
facts were simple. The plaintiff was walking on the wrong
side of the road with her back to the traffic when she was
struck and injured by an automobile proceeding in the same
direction. The automobile was being driven by the defendant,
who. did not see the plaintiff in time to avoid the injury. This
was an easy case of negligence and contributory negligence
and should have ended in the trial court in favor of the de-
fendant. Instead the jury found for the plaintiff on the usual
instruction embodying the humanitarian doctrine of last clear
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chance which the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals had
repeatedly held to be the law. The trial court gave judgment
on the verdict. The sole issue on appeal was whether the
plaintiff should recover under the doctrine of last clear
chance. The Virginia humanitarian doctrine caused the Court
of Appeals to apply last clear chance. Then, realizing that
the result would be that an inattentive defendant would be held
liable to an equally inattentive plaintiff, the court was com-
pelled to find some device to avoid that result. Indeed, it
employed all three of the devices discussed above. Had last
clear chance not been introduced it would not have been
necessary to make the second error to bring about the proper
result. Here two wrongs made a right. The court, when con-
fronted by its previous decisions where the -above devices were
not used, said at p. 719: "When the doctrine applies is to be
determined by the facts of the particular case." Such a state-
ment is an admission that the court does not wish to be bound
by any set rule. Again, at p. 720, the court said: "The evidence
in fact shows that her negligence was more responsible for
the accident than was his." Thus, the language of last clear
chance is being used to camouflage the appdication of the
doctrine of comparative negligence which, we are told, does
not obtain in Virginia.
There was a separate opinion by Justice Miller, in which
he was joined by Chief Justice Hudgins and Justice Spratley,
which concurred in the result but was a strong dissent from
the view of the majority on its statement of the last clear
chance doctrine. The concurring opinion sufficiently demon-
strates the fallacies of the court's traditional method of
handling problems of last clear chance. This excellent con-
curring opinion foreshadowed the unanimous decision of the
court in the Grecar case which overruled former cases and
adopted Rule # 2, above, as the law in Virginia. The court
has been converted. This is a new creed for the Virginia
court though it is an old creed elsewhere. A burden is placed
on the bar not to encourage or permit the new converts to
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backslide. There is already some slight evidence of back-
sliding.
There have been three Virginia cases, and one Federal case
applying Virginia law, since the Greear decision. In chrono-
logical order they are:
Brown v. Vinson, Adm'r. 198 Va. 495 (1956). This case is
in accord with the Greear case. The court approved an in-
struction precisely embodying the new rule. It is unfortunate
that the Greear case was not cited. After deciding that the
defendant did not have a clear chance to avoid the injury, the
court went further and copied erroneous language from cases
prior to the Greear case which had been overruled by it.
The court, at p. 499, said: "Such doctrine applies only when
the negligence of the defendant becomes a proximate cause
and the negligence of the plaintiff a remote cause." This is a
continuation of the court's old habit of attempting to explain
the concept of last clear chance by use of proximate cause
language. Of course, the doctrine of last clear chance has no
application whatever unless the plaintiff's negligence is a
proximate cause of the injury as previously explained. Fur-
ther, at the same place, the court said "the negligence of
the plaintiff's decedent continued down to the time of the
collision . . " This device to neutralize the humanitarian
doctrine is no longer needed since the Greear case abolished
the humanitarian doctrine. This part of the opinion indicates
that the new doctrine of the Greear case is not yet thoroughly
understood.
Davis, Adm'r. v. Scarborovgh, 199 Va. 100 (1957). The
court approved the new doctrine of the Greear case and cor-
rectly applied it.
Nichelson, Comm. v. Stroup, 249 F. 2d 874 (1957). The
court ouoted Rule # 2 from the Greear case and correctly
applied it.
Cook v. Shoulder, 200 Va. 281 (1958). The court quoted
from, cited, and correctly applied the rule of the Greear case.
Again, unfortunately, the court carelessly employed the lan-
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guage of proximate cause to explain the doctrine of last clear
chance.
After seventy-one years of vacillation and confusion Vir-
ginia has adopted a precise, sound, and practicable new last
clear chance doctrine. It will be a challenge to the bar, as
well as to the courts, to see to it that the new rule, uncon-
taminated by the older cases, remains the settled law of this
state. The Greear case furnishes a new starting point. The
erroneous language of the earlier cases should not be em-
ployed either in attorney's briefs or in court opinions.
